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Abstract—Smart contracts are self-enforcing agreements that
are employed to exchange assets without the approval of trusted
third parties. This feature has encouraged various sectors to
make use of smart contracts when transacting. Experience shows
that many deployed contracts are vulnerable to exploitation due
to their poor design, which allows attackers to steal valuable as-
sets from the involved parties. Therefore, an assessment approach
that allows developers to recognise the consequences of deploying
vulnerable contracts is needed. In this paper, we propose a debt-
aware approach for assessing security design vulnerabilities in
smart contracts. Our assessment approach involves two main
steps: (i) identification of design vulnerabilities using security
analysis techniques and (ii) an estimation of the ramifications
of the identified vulnerabilities leveraging the technical debt
metaphor, its principal and interest. We use examples of vulner-
able contracts to demonstrate the applicability of our approach.
The results show that our assessment approach increases the
visibility of security design issues. It also allows developers to
concentrate on resolving smart contract vulnerabilities through
technical debt impact analysis and prioritisation. Developers
can use our approach to inform the design of more secure
contracts and for reducing unintentional debts caused by a lack
of awareness of security issues.
Index Terms—smart contract, technical debt, security
I. INTRODUCTION
A smart contract is a decentralised code agreement designed
to impose an automatic negotiation of a series of instructions
without requiring approval by a central authority [43]. Despite
the infancy of smart contracts, their emergence has disrupted
several sectors, including cryptocurrencies, financial services,
insurance, healthcare, and decentralised management, among
others [7]. The widespread usage of this emerging technol-
ogy has incentivised attackers to exploit its existing security
and privacy challenges. Various malicious attacks have been
accomplished due to deploying poorly designed or vulnerable
smart contracts
Uploading smart contract to the public blockchain is not
free as a specific amount of money is required to be paid
for each deployment process [46]. Moreover, different from
traditional distributed software that can be patched when
vulnerabilities are discovered, smart contracts are irreversible
and immutable [17]. These properties mean that once a smart
contract is deployed in the chain, it cannot be subsequently
modified. Therefore, a timely identification of vulnerability is
crucial to save business value [11], [12]. In practice, design
vulnerabilities do not only originate from 50% of security
issues [36] but they are also the most harmful [39] and
difficult to identify [25], [45]. Securing smart contracts calls
for approaches that can accelerate the identification of root
causes of vulnerabilities in the design of such contracts.
The novel contribution of this paper is a debt-aware ap-
proach for assessing security design vulnerabilities in smart
contracts. The technical debt metaphor has proven to be effec-
tive to measure the impact of security weaknesses exploitation
in terms of damage to business value [12], the ramifications
of negative decisions over time, and locate the design root
of security vulnerabilities [25]. Then, we leverage on the
metaphor to estimate the monetary cost of redeploying the
patched version of the vulnerable contract and the evolution
of the debt interest linked to a design vulnerability. Our
approach is based on automated analysis tools to discover
potential security vulnerabilities caused by design decisions.
The evolution of the negative consequences of these security
issues in the smart contracts are estimated as an analogy with
the concepts of debt principal and interest growth rate.
This research intends to answer the following research
questions (RQ): RQ1: How to identify design vulnerabilities
in smart contracts? What are the specific analysis techniques
and tools? RQ2: How to quantify the impact of technical debts
related to design vulnerabilities in smart contracts?
Although prior works have introduced the idea of technical
debt in the context of software security [11], [12], [25], [35], to
the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to introduce the
metaphor to discuss design vulnerabilities that lead to security
issues in smart contracts. Moreover, although previous works
have surveyed smart contract vulnerabilities [15], [10], [2],
up to our knowledge, this research is the first to focus on
design vulnerabilities and map them to their related entries
in the Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) list, which
is a catalog of common software and hardware weakness
types [20]. Additionally, different from previous efforts that
performed empirical evaluations of automated analysis tools
to compare their real capabilities [5], [32], [14], this work
characterise a set of automated analysis tools that can discover
a group of design vulnerabilities pertinent to smart contracts.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Smart Contracts and Ethereum
A smart contract is stored and run on blockchain technology,
a distributed database that stores transactions in a decentralised
sequence of blocks. Thus, the correct execution of the contract
is enforced by the blockchain consensus protocol [43].
Ethereum is the most popular general-purpose blockchain
platform that enables developers to deploy smart contracts
written using Turing-complete languages such as Solidity.
Solidity is an object-oriented language designed specifically
for writing blockchain contracts. The programmable contracts
are then compiled into bytecode that executes on the Ethereum
Virtual Machine (EVM). EVM executes typical cryptocurrency
transactions and contracts bytecode, which are a special kind
of transaction [44].
In practice, several properties distinguish smart contracts
from regular computer programs and make the implications
of deploying vulnerable contract more severe. First, the pri-
mary distinction is that contracts operate on a decentralised
public blockchain network that makes the contract open for
inspection, with the state of the contract transparent and
traceable by everyone [43]. Second, contracts typically handle
monetary transactions that can involve considerable amounts
of Ether, an Ethereum cryptocurrency with a current market
value equivalent to billions of dollars [2]. The combination
of monetary value and public availability makes vulnerable
smart contacts compelling targets for attackers. Third, smart
contracts are irreversible and immutable. Thus, vulnerable
contracts cannot be patched after deployment to the blockchain
[17]. The only way to fix the contract, is to deploy a new
version with a repair code. However, the old version will
remain in the blockchain. Fourth, deploying and executing
smart contracts cost an amount of gas (the fuel of computation
in Ethereum) [46].
To prevent the abuse of computational resources, in
Ethereum, developers and users are required to pay a gas
fee to deploy and to execute contracts, respectively [44]. The
concept of gas involves the following: (i) gas cost, which is
a constant amount that determines the computational effort
required to execute specific operations; (ii) gas price, which
denotes the amount of Ether that users are required to pay for
each unit of gas; it is dynamic, governed by Ethereum miners,
and measured in Gwei (1 Gwei = 0.000000001 Ether); and (iii)
gas fee, which is the incentive received by miners in exchange
for the computional resources used to execute the operations
of a contract and the building of blocks; gas fee is converted
to Ether and paid to miners.
B. The Common Weakness Scoring System
The Common Weakness Scoring System (CWSS™) [21]
provides a quantitative mechanism to score unfixed CWEs
found in software. The system supports a prioritisation of
weaknesses in terms of their potential negative consequences.
The scoring formula is based on three metrics: Base Finding,
which consists of several factors that estimate the level of
technical impact once the weakness is successfully exploited,
the accuracy of finding, and the effectiveness of the existing
control; Attack Surface, whose factors estimate how easy the
attacker could exploit the weakness; Environmental, which
involves factors that refer to a specific operational context such
as the potential impact to the business and the likelihood of
discovery. Each metric factor is assigned a numeric value that
is calculated based on specific formulas, and the sub-score of
each metric is multiplied with each other to generate the final
CWSS score in a range between 0 and 100.
C. Technical Debt
Technical debt is a metaphor devised to capture how the
value of software engineering decisions evolves over time [19].
Specifically, the metaphor supports the identification of the
roots of a sub-optimal decision, the estimation of its value, and
the monitoring of the environmental trade-offs in which the
decision was made [13]. The metaphor also supports attributes
that are intrinsic to debts in finance such as principal and
interest [41]. In the metaphor, the principal represents the value
of the gap between the ideal and the actual decision, whereas
the interest represents the additional effort that needs to be
incurred to pay back the principal.
Technical debt has been applied in architectural design to
value the gap between the ideal and an actual decision, to
identify the architectural root of an issue, and to manage
the debt incurred by a decision [41], among others. Since
some roots of security issues tend to be intertwined with
architectural decisions, the metaphor has also been used to
identify security vulnerabilities [25], prioritise the attention to
security weaknesses [12], and to estimate the consequences on
business value if vulnerabilities are exploited [11].
III. OUR APPROACH FOR ASSESSING TECHNICAL DEBTS
This section presents our approach to assessing the security
technical debts incurred in smart contracts design. The assess-
ment involves detecting design issues and quantifying their
consequences to security if remain unfixed.
We have defined the steps that support the creation of secure
by design smart contracts:
1) Identify security design vulnerabilities in a smart contract.
a) Run automated security analysis tools on the smart
contract source code to obtain a list of potential vul-
nerabilities.
b) Perform a manual analysis complementing the auto-
mated analysis to uncover any missed vulnerability.
c) Determine the design vulnerabilities and map them to
related weaknesses to highlight the root cause of the
issues.
d) Classify the design vulnerabilities per design flaw
categories to determine the negative technical impact
upon the contract.
2) Measure the ramifications of the identified design vulner-
abilities.
a) Estimate the monetary cost of technical debt principal
by calculating the gas fee for redeploying a patched
version of the vulnerable contract.
b) For each vulnerability identified, estimate technical
debt interest value by quantifying the negative security
consequences and the interest growth rate over time.
Our approach is a debt-aware assessment approach, as it
facilitates visualisation of the debt incurred by exploitable
flaws created while designing smart contracts. Furthermore,
applying this approach, developers can be aware of the long-
term consequences of security design issues. Subsequently, the
developer can prioritise the debt based on both the monetary
cost and the interest value related with vulnerability violations.
A. Identification of Security Design Vulnerabilities
Building our assessment approach involves two steps: ag-
gregating vulnerabilities caused by flaws in smart contracts
design, Subsection III-A1, and selecting security analysis tools
that assists the identification process, Subsection III-A2.
1) Mapping Design vulnerabilities to Security Design
Weaknesses: Security flaws coming from design decisions
have been reported as the main cause of software security
problems [25]. If these flaws remain unaddressed, these can
be viewed as root cause of technical debt, with consequences
observed through accumulation of interests over time [11]
[25]. Additionally, if security software engineers are aware
of these issues but they do not fix them, these workarounds
can be considered as (self-) admitted technical debts.
Although several efforts, from industry and academia, illus-
trate smart contract vulnerabilities, they have missed to distin-
guish between coding and architectural design vulnerabilities.
Therefore, in this study, we present a set of vulnerabilities
rooted in the architectural design of smart contracts and their
related security weaknesses. The aggregated set is classified
based on the security impact of such issues.
Security weaknesses are flaws in software that may lead to
exploitable security vulnerabilities. Therefore, the identifica-
tion of weaknesses can assist us in understanding the security
problems and performing root cause analysis. Our study lever-
ages Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE™) [20], which
is a community-developed list of common security weaknesses
that may appear in architecture, design, or implementation
of software. Thus, we aim to map vulnerabilities in contract
design to security weaknesses in the CWE catalog that stands
out regarding adoption and scope of coverage. Although CWE
does not refer to any weaknesses particular to smart contracts,
it depicts associated weaknesses at higher abstraction layers.
We followed a systematic procedure to collect and map
each design vulnerability in contract design architecture to the
corresponding weaknesses in CWE. This procedure consisted
of two steps.
First, we collected a comprehensive list of security vulner-
abilities from academic papers that surveyed existent vulnera-
bilities in smart contracts [10] [15] [2] [1]; we also considered
Ethereum community [29], wiki [8], and developers’ blogs
[47] [34] that listed and explained exploitable flaws not dis-
cussed in the literature. Specifically, we extracted information
about the vulnerabilities, such as their descriptions, ways of
exploitation, and preventive techniques that can be used to
avoid them. The collected information assisted in knowing
the negative impacts of these issues on the contracts and
the cost of fixing them. In addition, the information also
helped to determine the vulnerabilities that result from the
flaws manifested at the contract’s design stages. Second, we
analysed each collected vulnerability to map it with the subset
of weaknesses (438/1248) of CWE. This subset represents
weaknesses that can be introduced during a design stage.
To reduce inherently biases in the mapping process, two
authors separately worked over all the collected vulnerabilities.
After completing the analysis, results were compared and
double-checked with Smart Contract Weakness Classification
(SWC) [38] Registry. This registry established by a group of
developers, auditors, and researchers at ConsenSys Diligence
[3] that provides smart contracts developers with a system
analog to CWE. However, at the time of writing, only 20
architectural design weaknesses are listed in the registry.
Finally, each disagreement was discussed with a third author.
We observed that the identified design vulnerabilities can
be classified based on their impact into ten categories. Front-
Running, Time Manipulation, Denial of Services (DoS), Bro-
ken Access Control, Arithmetic Issues, and Bad Randomness.
These first six categories are also presented in Decentralised
Application Security Project (DASP) [9] taxonomy. Other
categories are Sensitive Data Exposure and Using Components
with Known Vulnerabilities, which are the third and ninth cat-
egory, respectively in Open Web Application Security Project
(OWSAP)-Top 10 Security Risks [31]. The two remaining
categories are Improper Inheritance and Modularity Violation,
which are the flaws that violate object-oriented design prin-
ciples. Since Solidity is an objected oriented language, the
contracts written by this language are also prone to these types
of design flaws.
Table I describes each design flaws category, whereas Table
II shows an example of mapping the design vulnerabilities
classified under DoS to relevant CWEs. Our replication pack-
age, described in Subsection III-C carries full details of the
mapping.
Our classification allows the designers to select a specific
design flaws category and visualise all related vulnerabilities
and weaknesses. It may also serve as a guide for architects
to avoid common security architectural issues when creating
smart contracts.
2) Selection of Security Analysis Tools: The analysis of po-
tential vulnerabilities in smart contracts needs to be performed
before its deployment to the immutable environment of the
blockchain, in which refactoring or updating the contract is
costly and not trivial.
Recently, a growing number of security analysis tools have
emerged to detect common vulnerabilities and bad practices in
Ethereum smart contracts written in Solidity. Although these
TABLE I
DESCRIPTION OF DESIGN FLAWS CATEGORIES
Category Source of Category Description
Front-Running DASP A type of race condition where a malicious user can steal the solution and submit a transaction with a
higher gas price to make their transaction assigned to the block before the victim.
Time Manipulation DASP The timestamp of the block is adjusted by malicious miners to their own advantage.
Denial of Services DASP The attacker can make the contract inoperable temporarily or permanently.
Arithmetic Issues DASP An arithmetic operation that reaches the max or min size of a type and presents incorrect results that
compromise contract security and reliability.
Bad Randomness DASP The random number generator is written in a way that is predictable and exploitable.
Sensitive Data Exposure OWSAP-10 The developer does not adequately protect critical information related to the contract and assumes that
private type variables cannot be read.
Using Components with
Known Vulnerabilities OWSAP-10 Malicious or deficient components, such as libraries or off-chain data sources, where the developerunaware of all the running code.
Improper Inheritance Object OrientedDesign Flaws When a contract inherits another contract, the presence of multiple variables with the same name in bothcontracts might lead to unintended effects.
Modularity Violation Object OrientedDesign Flaws This consists of a tight coupling between contracts that makes them frequently change together.
tools have been developed by different teams such as academic
teams [42], community teams [17], and industrial teams [22],
most of the existing tools are inaccurate in finding the security
issues as they yield a considerable number of false positives
[5] [32]. Furthermore, each tool only detects a limited scope
of vulnerabilities. Consequently, the combination of several
existing tools is essential to increase coverage and accuracy
of vulnerabilities detection.
In this study, we selected a set of security analysis tools that
help in identifying design vulnerabilities in smart contracts. To
do that, we investigated the academic literature, searched the
Internet, and scanned Github. The tools selected for our study
were those matching the following criteria (C):
C#1. The tool is free, publicly available and specific informa-
tion about it can be found in at least one official source.
C#2. The tool is up to date.
C#3.The tool can take source code of the contract as an input.
C#4. The tool identified at least one design vulnerability or
bad practice related to design.
After exploring all the collected tools, we identified only
9 tools that met the criteria. These tools are: Slither [6],
SmartCheck [40], and Securify [42] which perform static
TABLE II
A VULNERABILITIES MAPPING FOR DOS TO CWE CATEGORISATION
Design Vulnerabilities CWE Design Weaknesses
Exception handling prob-
lem
CWE-703 Improper Check or Handlingof Exceptional Conditions
Non-validated arguments CWE-20 Improper Input Validation
DoS by external
contract/Call
CWE-703 Improper Check or Handlingof Exceptional Conditions
Calculates the upper bond
of Gas
CWE-400 Uncontrolled ResourceConsumption
Costly pattern/Costly loop CWE-400 Uncontrolled ResourceConsumption
Reachable SELFDE-
STRUCT
CWE-28 Improper Access Control
analysis techniques. Mythril [23] which is a symbolic analysis
tool and Manticore [22] which perform dynamic symbolic
execution identification. Another tool is sFuzz [24] which
applies a fuzzing testing technique. Solhint [33] and Ethlint
[4] perform static analysis to identify security issues and bad
practices. Final tool is Mythos which applies a combination
of dynamic symbolic execution and fuzzing techniques.
B. Measurement of Negative Consequences of Design vulner-
ability in Smart Contracts
Besides detecting vulnerabilities, it is also crucial to es-
timate the associated implications of taking a shortcut by
not fixing those issues. To this end, we adopt the notions
of principal and interest to quantify the debt cost and value
related to each identified vulnerability in a smart contract.
Quantifying the cost and value of the security debts aids
developers to apply a cost-effective technique and justifies the
investment in fixing security problems.
1) Estimation of Gas Cost (Quantifying the Principal):
Immutability in smart contracts restricts developers’ ability
to patch vulnerabilities after deploying the contract to the
blockchain. The developer needs to upload a new version of
the contract after fixing those vulnerabilities, and this requires
additional gas consumption with the associated expenses. As
a result, the need to refactor vulnerable deployed contract has
financial implications.
Our aim is to calculate the gas consumption fee for rede-
ploying a contract to estimate technical debt principal (P). This
estimation provides useful insights for developers regarding
the cost of repairing vulnerabilities in the deployed contracts.
We use the following formula:
PSecurityDebt = Gas_D(c) +Gas_U(c) (1)
where Gas_D indicates the cost of gas required to deploy the
repaired contract (c), and Gas_U indicates the cost of the gas
required to update the contract (c) for a given issue.
Gas Cost Required to Redeploy Repaired Contract. The
cost of the gas required for deployment depends on the size of
the smart contract. The number of functions (NoF) and lines of
code (LoC) are both influencing factors, and the more complex
the contract is, the more gas consumption is required. The
uploading cost fee is computed using gas_price × gas_cost,
where the former is the value of a unit of gas as specified
by the market, and the latter is mostly determined by the
summation of the following factors:
Gcreate, 32000 gas, paid for a CREATE operation,
Gtransaction, 21000 gas, paid for every transaction,
Gcodedeposit, 200 × |o| gas, paid per byte for a create operation,
|o| amount of bytecode in the compiled contract,
Execution costs, gas paid for necessary computation processes.
The last factor refers to the costs associated with the part of
the code that requires to be executed before the creation of the
contract, such as initialising the state variables whose values
are permanently stored in the contract storage, and executing
a constructor. If the constructor requires a lot of computation
to generate the bytecode, then there will be extra expense.
Appendix G in the Ethereum yellow paper [44] shows the
costs, in gas, of several opcode operations.
Gas Cost of Update Pattern. Since redeployment results in
a new contract with a new address, an update pattern needs to
be utilised to avoid using the vulnerable deprecated contract.
The developer can use a self-destruct opcode, which costs
Gselfdestruct = 5000 gas, to destroy the contract. Another
option is to upload the main contract with a proxy smart
contract, which has a changeable variable that stores the main
contract’s address. Thus, once an updated contract version is
released, the value of this version is updated.
2) Estimation of Security Consequences (Quantifying the
Interest): In the security context, the interest value represents
the undesirable effects that can result if the vulnerability is
exploited. The longer the exploitable design flaw remains
unaddressed in the deployed contract, the higher the chance
the debt interest associated with this flaw grows. Accordingly,
three factors are considered when estimating the accumulated
interest: CWSS score, contract activity level, and contract
lifespan.
CWSS Score. We adopted the CWSS to estimate the
severity of identified weaknesses in a contract. The CWSS
framework provides different scoring methods; in this study,
we use the targeted method, which assesses individual design
weakness. Multiple factors are used to quantify CWSS scores
in smart contracts, such as mapping the vulnerabilities to the
related CWEs and the proposed design flaws categories. This
information allows the negative impact on the contract in the
case of an attack to be estimated. The estimated score gener-
ated by CWSS allows for technical debt items to be visualised
and those debts that lead to more severe consequences to
be addressed. In practice, addressing contract security design
issues early, in the pre-deployment stage, minimises debt.
Accumulated interest. Debt interest increases when ex-
ploited contracts become extremely common like, for example,
the hacked Parity Multi-Sig Wallet contract [2]. This was
a smart contract for a multiple signature wallet that had a
critical, exploitable vulnerability, which allowed an attacker to
steal millions of dollars. The debt interest also increases if the
exploitation of vulnerabilities in the contract has irreparable
consequences, as is the case with suicidal vulnerability. With
this vulnerability, any arbitrary account can kill a contract,
causing it to stop functioning and locking its ether [42].
The accumulation of interest associated with vulnerabilities in
smart contracts is difficult to quantify; however, we find that
the activity level and the lifespan of the contract are useful for
estimating interest growth.
Contract Activity Level (CAL). CAL refers to the expected
number of active users and the number of transactions that a
contract is expected to deal with. This factor can be predicted
from statistical information about contracts provided on web-
sites, such as State of the ÐApps [27], which is a website
with a curated list of smart contract-based applications. This
website ranks the contracts and categorises them based on their
activity level. Statistical research [28] shows that the top three
high-activity contract categories in 2020 are games, currency
exchanges, and gambling.
Contract Lifespan (CLS). CLS refers to the time, mea-
sured in days, between the contract’s deployment and its last
execution. Most smart contracts live between 2 and 800 days
[16], and the average age of smart contracts is 295.6 days
[28]. A contract can be short-lived, medium-lived, or long-
lived [28], [16]. A contract is long-lived when it is expected
to be executed for a long interval or even for as long as the
network exists. Conversely, a short-lived contract is mostly
designed to be executed for a limited time and then either the
interaction with it ends or it is destroyed. This type of contract
typically includes few operations, involves few fixed users,
and has limited transactions. Thus, the security implications
of breaching this contract are not significant compared to a
long-lived, highly active contract in which there is interaction
with thousands of customers and thousands of transactions are
accepted over a long period of time.
Therefore, during the CLS period (i.e., before the contract
reaches its maturity stage), the accumulated interest (AI) of
the security technical debt can be estimated as follows:
AISecurityDebt = CWSSscore× CAL× CLS (2)
Nevertheless, we acknowledge that some issues may go be-
yond, and the interest can be adjusted accordingly. For this
paper, we focus on interest within the CLS period, as this
enables action to be taken before contract redemption to avoid
the accumulation of the issues that are rooted in technical debt.
The developer can assign a point scale to each contract ac-
tivity level category and lifespan category. The multiplication
of the scores of the three factors determines the accumulated
interest.
C. Replication Package for Replicability
The data source and replication package for our experiments
are publicly available 1 to assist in verifiability and repro-
ducibility of our results.The package includes: (i) the complete
mapping of all aggregated design vulnerabilities and their rated
CWE entries; (ii) the list of all founded analysis tools; (iii) the
1https://bitbucket.org/Smart_Contract/assessing-smart-contracts-security
TABLE III
EXPERIMENT DATASET. FOR EACH VULNERABLE CONTRACT, WE
PROVIDE DESIGN FLAWS CATEGORIES OF ITS FLAWS (DFC), NUMBER OF
DESIGN VULNERABILITIES (VULNS), AND LINES OF CODE (LOC).
Contracts DFC #Vulns #LOC
FindThisHash Front-Running 1 9
EtherLotto Time Manipulation /Bad Randomness 1 20
Roulette Time Manipulation 1 14
Lottopollo Time Manipulation /Bad Randomness 1 24
DosAuction DoS 1 13
SimpleToken DoS /Access Control Broken 1 65
Etheraffle DoS/ Bad Randomness 2 122
DosNumber DoS 1 28
AccessControl Access Control Broken 1 53
BlockdBuildDemo Access Control Broken 3 62
FunctionTypes Access Control Broken 2 18
OddEven Sensitive Data Exposure 1 22
Transaction_malleablity Sensitive Data Exposure 1 77
Token Arithmetic Issues 1 17
TokenSaleChallenge Arithmetic Issues 1 20
CEOThrone Improper Inheritance 1 21
set of vulnerabilities claimed to be identified by each tool; (iv)
details of inclusion criteria that were not met by each of the
excluded tools; (v) the dataset used in the experiment; and (vi)
the detailed results of each step of the approach.
IV. EXPERIMENTATION
To demonstrate our approach, the following example shows
how the steps of our approach are performed to assess the
potential security-related debts in smart contracts.
A. Experiment Setup
We collected a dataset of 16 representative vulnerable smart
contracts that are either actual contracts identified as vulner-
able or explicitly programmed to demonstrate a specific vul-
nerability. This dataset comes from several publicly-available
resources: (i) GitHub repositories such as SWC Registry,
not-so-smart-contracts [26], and Solidity-Security [18]; (ii)
Ethernet [30], an online game for smart contract attacking
challenges; and (iii) blog.positive [37], which publishes articles
discussing vulnerabilities in smart contracts.
We intentionally chose a dataset of known vulnerable
contracts to examine the ability of the 9 selected security
analysis tools to identify vulnerabilities. Our selection of
smart contracts enables a discussion of their source codes and
permits the publication of our results for replication without
users being involved in legal and privacy issues.
All the tools are installed and run on the same computer util-
ising Solidity compiler- solc (v 0.7.1), under Ubuntu 18.04.5
operating system. Only sFuzz provides a web-based interface
for using the tool, then there was no need to install anything
related to it.
B. Experimental Study
Figure 1 represents the overall procedure of our experiment.
Step 1.a. We first ran the automatic security tools against
each contract in our dataset to identify the design vulnerabil-
ities. As mentioned in the previous section, different types of
tools were selected to enhance the detection abilities of design
vulnerabilities. We started the operation process by running the
tools that perform static analysis techniques. After the static
analysis has been completed, operating the tools that perform
dynamic analysis techniques was the next step for obtaining
deeper results. We finalised the analysis by running the tool’s
applied fuzzing techniques.
Step 1.b. We conducted a manual analysis to complement
the previous step as the 9 tools could not detect all the
known vulnerabilities in the dataset. We annotated the known
vulnerabilities and detected several other flaws that were not
mentioned in the online source with regard to the vulnerable
contracts. We ended up with a set of possible vulnerabilities
that was composed of flaws not related to the design.
Step 1.c.&1.d. We checked the aggregated set of design
vulnerabilities and the aligned CWEs to only record the
issues that belonged to that set. Each contract had one or
more vulnerabilities mapped in at least one of the design
flaw categories. There were 20 distinct vulnerabilities in our
dataset. Table III shows each collected contract, its name, the
categories of its flaws, the number of design vulnerabilities,
and the lines of code.
Step 2.a. The cost fees required to deploy the patches
contracts were calculated by Formula 1 to quantify the tech-
nical debt principal. A self-destruct updated pattern were
considered when calculating the total gas cost. At the time
of experimenting, the average gas price was 126 Gwei, and
Ether’s price was around $500 US.
Step 2.b. We estimated the security risk severity scores
related to identified vulnerabilities and weaknesses using the
CWSS formula that explained in Subsection II-B . We used the
OWSAP method to estimate the technical and business impact
factors, in case vulnerabilities are exploited. This method
suggests dividing the technical impact into sub-factors aligned
with the traditional security areas of concern: loss of confiden-
tiality, integrity, availability, and accountability. Additionally,
our proposed categories of design flaws support determining
the technical impact as each category shows the ramifications
of the exploitation. Similarly, the method divides the business
impact factor into sub-factors common to many businesses:
financial damage, reputation damage, non-compliance, and
privacy violation. Each sub-factor has several scored options.
We selected one of the options and then averaged the scores
for each factor, technical and business impacts, to decide their
severity level.
There are other required factors to calculate the CWSS
score, such as required privileges; authentication and access
vector to perform the attack; and the acquired privilege after
accomplish it. These factors were determined based on the
information collected about each vulnerability and the way
of exploiting it. The knowledge about the vulnerable contracts
and security analysis performed assisted in determining factors
such as finding confidence, likelihood of discovery and exploit.
Smart 
Contracts
Apply Security Analysis 
( Automated & Manual) 
Step 1.a & 1.b
Set of Vulner-
abilities
Identify and map design 
vulnerabilities to CWEs  
Step 1.c 
Estimate the severity of the 
consequences (CWSS score ) 
Step 2.b 
Estimate the growth 
rate (CAL & CLS) 
Step 2.b
Result = TD Principal 
and TD Interest 
Classify them into the 
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Fig. 1. Experiment execution steps
In addition to the CWSS score, the contract’s activity level
and lifespan factors have to be estimated to visualise the
potential accumulated interest. A six-point scale is used to
determine the activity level, where 6 refers to the top 3
highly active contract’s category, and 1 refers to the lowest
3 categories. The ranking of the categories is informed by
the State of the DApps website. Since most smart contracts
live between 2 to 800 days, we divided the lifespan into
three intervals and gave each interval a score as follows: (i)
Short-lived, 1-266 days, 0.17 score; (ii) Medium-lived, 267-
533 days, 0.35 score; (iii) Long-lived, 534-800+ days, 0.5
score. The accumulated interest for each unfixed vulnerability
were calculated by Formula 2. The value of the final score is
between 0 and 300. Noticeably, we set those particular scores
to visualise how the interest could redouble. However, contract
developer can customise the scores based on their context.
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, the collected dataset of some represented
vulnerable contracts are analysed and discussed with respect to
our research questions. Additionally, we discuss the practical
implications of our findings and we outline the potential threats
to their validity.
A. Identification of Design Vulnerabilities (RQ1)
Locating design vulnerabilities in smart contracts source
code is the main step in our assessment approach. Figure
2 presents the results of executing 9 security analysis tools
on 16 vulnerable contracts in order to locate their design
vulnerabilities. It shows the percentage of vulnerabilities that
each tool was able to detect per design flaws category.
Nine tools, in combination, were only able to locate 70%
(14/20) of all the vulnerabilities. Most of the tools were
generally able to detect a high percentage of vulnerabilities
classified in the categories Time Manipulation, Improper In-
heritance, and Bad Randomness. However, the tools under
performed when it came to identifying vulnerabilities of the
categories Front-Running and Sensitive Data Exposure. The
9 tools failed to detect four vulnerabilities linked to Access
Control Broken, one vulnerability linked to DoS, and another
linked to Sensitive Data Exposure. Throughout the analysis,
we observed that the output of some tools was noisy, as they
failed to disregard the false warnings and detected unreal flaws.
Figure 2 indicates that the tools demonstrate different ability
to locate design vulnerabilities. The tool Mythril surpassed
all other tools as it was able to identify more vulnerabilities
in the 16 contracts than any of the others. Securify is the
only tool that detected the vulnerability, Transaction Ordering
Dependency, linked to the Front-Running category. Although
the documentation of several tools such as Manticore claimed
that they could detect this vulnerability, they failed to iden-
tify it. Similarly, Smartcheck is the only tool that identified
the vulnerability, Unencrypted Private Data On-Chain, in the
Sensitive Data Exposure category. However, the output of
Smartcheck does not reveal a clear explanation of the identified
flaws. Mythril and Mythos both provide informative output as
they link the identified vulnerabilities to related SWC. Securify
resulted in the most confusing output among all the tools
because it showed a large number of false alarms.
Our study emphasises that conducting manual analysis to
complement automated ones is essential to discover most
vulnerabilities. This is because, as our analysis experiment
shows, the scope of issues addressed by state-of-the-art tools
is limited. Additionally, the accuracy of their analysis needs
to be increased by reducing the likelihood of false-positive
alarms that confuse the developers and discourage them from
leveraging the results. Even though an empirical study [5]
claimed that combining different types of analysis tools yields
more vulnerability coverage, the existing tools are not power-
ful enough to replace manual analysis. Thus, taking a shortcut
by deploying the contract to the public without performing
both automated and manual inspection processes might lead
to invisible exploitable flaws that are prone to attacks.
Through the analysis, all the detected flaws were found in
our aggregated set of design vulnerabilities and their associ-
ated weaknesses. In contrast, some of these detected flaws,
including no restricted write and no restricted transfer, did not
exist in the SWC Registry which provides a set of classified
issues that come up in smart contract development. Moreover,
our proposed design flaw categories cover all the detected
flaws, while the current DASP taxonomy is not extensive
enough to include all types of security design issues that
affect smart contracts. Unlike DASP, our classification includes
vulnerabilities of the following categories: Sensitive Data
Exposure, Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities,
Improper Inheritance, and Modularity Violation.
Classifying vulnerabilities based on their impact and map-
ping them to a wider group of agreed-upon weaknesses
(CWEs) come with several benefits: (i) it provides a common
language for defining security architectural design issues in
smart contracts; (ii) it offers a simple way to classify security
issues in such contracts; and (iii) it generates useful insights
into the root-causes of vulnerabilities, and the negative impacts
posed by the exploitable ones.
B. Estimation of Negative Consequences (RQ2)
The second step in our approach is to estimate the ramifica-
tion of deploying vulnerable contracts to the public blockchain
in terms of debt principal and accumulated interest. Figure 3
shows debt principal and interest of 10 vulnerable contracts
from our dataset out of 16. The figure represents the estimated
monetary cost of refactoring each contract and the value
Fig. 2. Identified vulnerabilities per category by each tool.
Fig. 3. Principal and interest of ten vulnerable contracts.
of the accumulated interest in relation to the effects of the
vulnerabilities over time, if they are left unfixed.
For the sake of visualising and discussing the data, we
have categorised the coordinates of the (cost, value) points
in the graph into three categories: high, medium, and low,
depending on their severity. Given the score for values in
this range [0,300], we defined (100<value<=200) as medium,
values greater than 200 as high, and values lower than or equal
100 as low. As in our example the highest cost is $100.25, we
defined ($33.33<cost<=$66.66) as medium, a cost greater than
$66.66 as high, and a cost lower than or equal to $33.33 as low.
The final degrees of severity are then derived from both the
cost and the value using Table IV. As such, vulnerabilities in
contracts 2, 9, and 10 fall into the high category; vulnerabilities
in contracts 3 and 8 into the medium category; and those in
contracts 1, 4, 5, 6, and 7 into the low category.
Estimating the cost and value related to security violations
in smart contracts facilitates decision-making regarding which
issues need more attention when seeking to reduce technical
debt. For instance, a vulnerability in the CEOThrone contract
is assumed to be in the high category. The cost of gas required
to fix the issue that has not been fixed before deployment is
897,200, which is equivalent to $51 at the time of writing.
The size of this contract is relatively small compared to other
contracts in our dataset. There is only one operation in the
constructor, and there are no state variables that need to be
initialised.
However, the contract suffers from variable shadowing
vulnerability, which occurs when a variable declared within
a child contract has the same name as a variable declared in
a parent contract. In the case of CEOThrone, this allows an
unauthorised node to withdraw the balance of the contract,
leading to a significant technical and business impact. The
likelihood of discovering and exploiting this issue is also
high, since most of the analysis tools were able to detect it.
The vulnerability in this contract allows any attacker to gain
the required privilege to exploit it. CEOThrone is a contract
created for a game and it can thus be assumed that the contract
will be highly active and have a long lifespan. As such,
we estimated the accumulated security debt interest for this
contract at around 228.9, which is a high score compared with
other contracts.
Beyond the results of our experiments, our assessment
approach can significantly reduce the cost of developing smart
contracts, in particular in cases where a contract is big and,
as such, has a potentially higher cost, or in the case of fixing
an issue in a contract that requires modifying and redeploying
other dependent contracts. We provided a quantitative way of
indicating the relative costs and values of publicly deploying
vulnerable contracts. Developers can thus make informative
decisions before uploading a contract to the blockchain. Ad-
ditionally, they can prioritise the resolution of issues based on
the available quantitative information. Overall, the assessment
approach presented here supports reducing the introduction of
unintentional debt caused by unawareness of security issues
rooted in smart contract design while increasing the visibility
of such issues and helping manage the debt more strategically.
C. Threats to Validity
A potential threat to internal validity is related to the
possibility of considering alternative security flaws scoring
methods. However, unlike other scoring systems, the CWSS
can be applied at the early stages of the development process.
CWSS provides support if there is incomplete information, as
most of its factors have values for uncertainty and flexibility,
such as Unknown and Not applicable. Furthermore, CWSS
facilitates a thorough estimation of the security consequences
of uploading vulnerable contracts. It considers 16 factors
compared to the only four factors in the risk rating of the
OWSAP method.
Another threat relates to the potential subjectivity of CWSS
results. We mitigated this possible risk as follows: (1) we
proposed categories of design flaws that enable precise de-
termination of technical impact; (2) conducting the security
analysis creates awareness of the ease and likelihood of
discovering any flaws; (3) in the proposed estimation Formula
2, the CWSS score is accompanied with smart contract activity




Cost High Medium Low
High Critical High Medium
Medium High Medium Low
Low Medium Low Low
A potential threat to external validity relates to the fact
that the contracts we have considered in our experiment are
relatively small and simple (approximately 1.5KB) - typical
size of commonly used contracts in practice as contracts are
recommended to be simple and not complex. Nevertheless,
the same steps and analysis can scale up to larger ones, often
not exceeding 24KB in practice. Referring to our 10 out of
16 selected contracts in our study, the estimated monetary
costs required to pay for repairing them were not significant.
However, the quantitative approach provided for calculating
the debt principal is applicable to any size and type of smart
contract. As mentioned earlier, the monetary cost is dynamic
as it depends on the gas price and the Ether price, either
of which may significantly increase. For instance, in January
2018 the price of Ether rose dramatically to $1066 US. Hence,
uploading even a small and simple contract might cost a
significant amount of money.
A potential threat to construct validity is the completeness
of the aggregated set of design vulnerabilities. We mitigated
this risk by conducting a thorough inspection of the academic
papers, the Ethereum community, Wiki pages, and developers’
blogs. Nevertheless, the set of vulnerabilities supplied is
continually evolving because of the high potential for the
emergence of new exploitable security design flaws in smart
contracts.
VI. RELATED WORK
We discuss closely related work, covering smart contract
vulnerabilities; empirical evaluations of automated analysis
tools that are relevant to our work; and security technical debt.
Smart Contract Vulnerabilities. Previous studies have
illustrated, discussed, or surveyed various security vulnerabil-
ities in blockchain and smart contracts. Li et al. [15] reviewed
the security vulnerabilities in blockchain, the corresponding
attacks, and suggested several security solutions, without
differentiating between Bitcoin and Ethereum. Similarly, the
authors in [10], classified the security vulnerabilities based
on blockchain generation. They also provided a detailed ex-
planation of known vulnerabilities and subsequent potential
attacks. Unlike these studies, we focus on design vulnerabil-
ities in smart contracts run on Ethereum. Other studies such
as that of Atzei et al. [1], discussed 12 known vulnerabilities
in Ethereum smart contracts, and classified them into three
categories based on the level where they presented: the Solidity
level, the EVM level, and the blockchain level. Similarly, au-
thors in [2] provided the same classification of vulnerabilities
in Ethereum smart contracts; however, they provided a more
comprehensive list. In contrast, we aggregated vulnerabilities
caused by flaws in a contract’s architectural design, mapped
them to their related CWE entries, and classified them based
on their impact.
Automated Analysis Tools. As several automated tools
have recently emerged to analyse the security of smart con-
tracts, empirical studies have been conducted to compare
their real capabilities and the techniques used. Durieux et
al. [5] carried out a systematic evaluation of several state-
of-the-art automated tools and discussed their accuracy and
efficiency. We also followed a systematic method when it came
to selecting the 9 tools that were used in the vulnerabilities
identification process. But different from other studies, we
identified and analysed a set of tools able to discover a
subset of design vulnerabilities. Parizi et al. [32] performed
an assessment of four static analysis tools with regard to 10
vulnerable smart contracts. In contrast, in our analysis, besides
using static analysis tools, we included tools that use dynamic
or fuzzing techniques. Additionally, we analysed their ability
to identify design vulnerabilities on 16 vulnerable contracts.
Leid et al. [14] compared the effectiveness of symbolic and
fuzzy testing tools by evaluating their effectiveness when
analysing smart contracts. Despite a large number of available
automated analysis tools, they only considered three tools in
their assessment.
Security Technical Debt. The nature of work presented
in this paper is generally related to applying technical debt
to raising the visibility of security risks, and the costly
consequences of deploying vulnerable smart contracts. Despite
the vast contributions on technical debt in software, only
few studies have looked at security-related debts including
[11] [12] [25] and [35]. In particular, Izurieta et al. [11]
established an approach to prioritise security technical debt
in a software system. This was related to CWEs entries by
leveraging the CWSS scoring systems. Unlike their approach,
our study proposes a mechanism to estimate the accumulated
debt interest, not only by using the CWSS score, but also by
including the activity level and lifespan of the smart contract
under consideration. Additionally, we quantify the debt prin-
ciple of refactoring the vulnerable contract. In [12], authors
mapped attack tactics to the related posed consequences of
the exploitable vulnerabilities. This helps to prioritise vulner-
abilities that require the most attention to reduce technical
debt. In [25], the authors applied a preliminary experiment
to show the correlation between technical debt and software
vulnerabilities. A recent study [35], regarding security debt,
discussed the concept of managing security risk by leveraging
technical debt. They emphasised that the combination of
software security engineering techniques and technical debt
increases the security of software systems. Our work goes
beyond existing work on security technical debt and is the
first to explicate security technical debts in smart contracts.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this article, we have presented a debt-aware approach
for assessing security design vulnerabilities in smart contracts.
We used nine state-of-the-art tools to widen the detection
abilities of security design issues in smart contracts. We use
CWE catalogue when analysing the identified vulnerabilities
and their weaknesses. We adapted the community-informed
scoring mechanism to consider contract activity level and the
contract lifespan. The combination helps security software
engineers to estimate the accumulated debt interests related
to design vulnerabilities in a contract. Debt principal was
quantified by calculating the gas fee required to redeploy the
patched version of a vulnerable contract. Experiment results
demonstrated that our approach can allow developers to visu-
alise and prioritise technical debts, rooted in unaddressed smart
contract design vulnerabilities. The approach can increase the
visibility of debts and their ramifications.
In future work, we seek to automate the estimation steps
of our approach to support faster and more efficient analysis.
Automated support will ensure consistency in the analysis
and allow security software engineers to quickly estimate
the implications of applying alternative security options when
designing smart contracts.
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